

Matthew Mckeever
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Employment

2018-. Assistant Editor, *Inquiry*.
2016-2018. Research Assistant for CSMN's ConceptLab
2016-17. Editorial Assistant, *Inquiry*
2015-. Symposium and Special Issue Coordinator, *Inquiry*

Education

2012-2016. PhD in Philosophy, University of St Andrews. Title: *Against Type E*. Pass without Corrections.
2012-13, 2014. Visiting Scholar, UT Austin
2011-12. M.Phil in Philosophy, Selwyn College Cambridge. Distinction.
2007-11. B.A. in Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin. First class with gold medal (awarded for an average of 75% or over).

Prizes

2015-6. Jacobsen Fellowship. ~8,000gbp
2012-2015. Full AHRC Funding for PhD. ~38,000gbp
2011-12. Full AHRC funding for M.Phil. ~10,000gbp
2011. Arthur Aston Luce Memorial Prize (for best performance in a component of B.A. Exams), Wray Prize (for best dissertation).
2009. Trinity Scholarship. ~30,000e in accommodation and fee waivers

Academic Philosophy Papers

'Parts Predicates and Impermanence: A Contemporary Version of Some Central Buddhist Tenets', forthcoming in *Religious Studies*.

'A Semantic Problem For Stage Theory', *Ergo*

Several other at r&r, invited, or in progress stage (details are on my website).

Non-Academic Philosophy

'There's Only One God and His Name Is Death', about aesthetics of death in *Game of Thrones*, in *Ultimate Game of Thrones and Philosophy*, OpenCourt, 2016
Coming From Nothing, philosophical novella about personal identity and the internet, due out 25.05.18

Some Recent Refereed Conferences

July 2016. Quantification without Quantifiers: Towards an e-type analysis of generalised quantifiers, Barcelona Operators vs Quantifiers Workshop
July 2016. Predicativism and Stage Theory: A Match Made in Heaven, Postgraduate Session of Joint Session

July 2015. Non-Rigid Demonstratives, Postgraduate Session of Joint Session

Teaching Experience

2013-2014. Tutor for Knowledge and Reality, first year course on metaphysics and epistemology, involved leading discussion each week and marking end of term essays and final exams.

2012-13. Tutor for Reasoning and Knowledge, first year course on logic and epistemology, involved leading discussion each week and marking end of term essays and final exams.

2011-12. Marker for logic tutorials in Cambridge, which involves a small amount of teaching

Languages

Reasonable to good reading knowledge in French, German, and Ancient Greek.

Dissertation Abstract

It's generally assumed that a compositional semantic theory will have to recognise a semantic category of expressions which serve simply to pick out some one object: e-type expressions. Kripke's views about names (Kripke, 1980), Kaplan's about indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989), the standard Tarskian semantics for bound variables (Tarski, 1956), Heim and Kratzer's Strawsonian view about definites (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), even an (admittedly somewhat unpopular) analysis of indefinites (namely Fodor and Sag, 1982), assume as much. In this thesis, I argue that recent advances in the semantics of names and of quotation, and in metaphysics, give good reason to doubt there is such a category. I do so in two parts. In the first part, comprising about two thirds of the thesis, I combine two recent views, one from semantics and one from metaphysics. From semantics, I take over predicativism about names, the view, as one might have guessed, that names are predicates. From metaphysics, I take over the doctrine that there are temporal parts. Putting them together, I hold that the semantic contribution of the name 'Joan', in a sentence like 'Joan is a barrister', is a predicate, and in particular (and somewhat roughly) a predicate the extension of which is Joan's temporal parts. In the second part, building on the first, I further undermine the existence of a semantically important category of e-type expressions by arguing that a construction which might be thought to mandate such a category, namely de re attitude ascriptions, in fact, when properly analysed, does not do so. I argue this by considering the nature of transparent occurrences of expressions in opaque contexts in general, and in particular by considering the phenomenon of mixed quotation. I'll present a new theory of it, and show how it can be parlayed into a new theory of de re attitude ascriptions. The thesis overall, then, will provide strong evidence against the semantic importance of singularity either in language, or in (our reporting of) thought.